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Abstract
This paper analyzes the performance of central banks in 27 inflation targeting
countries by examining their success in achieving their explicit inflation targets. For
this purpose, we decompose the inflation gap, the difference between actual inflation
and inflation target, into predictable and unpredictable components. We argue that
the central banks are successful if the predictable component in the inflation gap
diminishes over time. The predictable component of inflation gap is measured by the
conditional mean of a time-varying autoregressive model. Our results find considerable
heterogeneity in the success of these IT countries in achieving their targets at the start
of this policy regime. Our findings also suggest that the central banks of the IT adopting
countries started targeting inflation implicitly before becoming an explicit inflation
targeter. The panel data analysis suggests that the relative success of these countries
in reducing the gap is influenced by their institutional characteristics particularly by
fiscal discipline and macroeconomic performance.
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1 Introduction
Explicit inflation targeting (IT) is increasingly being adopted as one of the primary
methods of conducting monetary policy. The Reserve Bank of New Zealand initiated
inflation targeting in 1990. Since then, the number of countries that have adopted this
policy has risen to 271; the last of which was Serbia in 2009. One very impressive feature
of inflation targeting regime is that no country has left the inflation targeting family unlike
other monetary policy strategies like the exchange rate or monetary targeting (Mihov and
Rose (2008)). Under the IT regime, a central bank estimates and makes public a projected,
or ‘target’, inflation rate and then attempts to steer actual inflation towards the target
through the use of interest rate changes and other monetary policy tools.
The increasing popularity of this monetary policy strategy has evinced keen interest
among researchers. The literature on inflation targeting, however, is divided over the
efficacy of inflation targeting. There is one strand of literature where researchers argue
that IT strategy curbs inflation expectations due to the credibility, accountability and
transparency of central banks (Bernanke and Mishkin (1997), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2001), Levin et al. (2004), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007), Baxa et al. (2014)). The
opposite view takes the stand that the apparent success of IT regime in most of the countries
has been mainly due to favorable shocks affecting the global economy and these economies
would have witnessed low and stable inflation even in the absence of an IT regime (Johnson
(2002), Ball and Sheridan (2003), Lin and Ye (2007), Genc et al. (2007), Cecchetti and
Hakkio (2009))
Most of the existing studies on IT regime examine its efficacy by examining the behavior
of inflation after the adoption of this regime. Surprisingly, there is no comprehensive study
that takes into account the success of these IT countries in achieving their targets2. The
objective of our paper is to examine the effectiveness of the central banks in IT countries
in meeting their targets. We also examine whether the success in achieving their explicit
inflation targets is associated with the institutional strength of these countries.
The success in achieving the target announced publicly by the central bank is crucial
1Countries operating a fully fledged inflation targeting regime are: Armenia, Australia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, the Czech Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, New
Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Thailand,
Turkey and the United Kingdom (Hammond (2012)).
2One exception is Neuenkirch and Tillmann (2014) who evaluate the central banks’ response to inflation
gap for a sample of five inflation targeting countries.
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if the IT central bank wants to gain credibility. There are different reasons why actual
inflation may differ from the target. At the time of the adoption of the IT regime, the central
banks want to anchor inflationary expectations over medium to long-horizon. Therefore,
the short-term gap between actual inflation and target may not reflect the inability of the
central banks to hit their target. However, the central bank will lose credibility if the gap is
non-zero for a considerable period of time. The gap may also arise because of unpredictable
shocks, but the impact of these unpredictable shocks should not persist for a long period.
We use this feature of inflation targeting and propose to test the effectiveness of the IT
countries in meeting their target by decomposing the gap between actual inflation and
the target into predictable and unpredictable components. If the IT regime is perfectly
successful in meeting its target, then any gap between the actual and the targeted inflation
should be unpredictable (Bernanke and Mishkin (1997)). This implies that a successful IT
regime should bring down the predictable component of the inflation gap to zero over the
medium-horizon if they are successful in bridging the gap that was predictable in advance.
The hypothesized relationship between the predictable component of inflation gap and the
success of the IT regime is motivated by the monetary policy effectiveness literature where
researchers like Benati and Surico (2008) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) among others
have shown that the aggressive policy stance towards inflation causes a decline in inflation
predictability. The empirical evidence presented in D’Agostino and Surico (2012) for the
twentieth century also supports the above hypothesis where they find that the inflation
forecasts based on money growth and output growth were significantly more accurate than
the na¨ıve forecasts only during the regimes associated with neither a clear nominal anchor
nor a credible commitment to fight inflation.
We examine the success of the IT countries in meeting their target by estimating the
predictable component of inflation gap from a time-varying autoregressive model. The
conditional expectation of this TVP-AR model is the predictable component of the inflation
gap. The TVP-AR model takes into account the fact that the capability of the central
bank to achieve its target varies over time and is affected by institutional characteristics
like fiscal situation, central bank independence and financial market depth among others.
Our approach is able to capture the gradual transition of actual inflation to its target over
time. Moreover, we perform a panel analysis to examine the relationship between inflation
gap and institutional characteristics of these countries.
We find considerable heterogeneity in the success of the IT countries in bridging the gap
between actual inflation and the target in the years immediately after the adoption of the
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IT regime. We find that the predictable component of inflation gap was close to zero for
the countries with relatively low level and volatility of inflation even at the beginning of
this regime. However, we find that the predictable component of inflation converged to zero
implying higher degree of success in achieving the target for almost all the IT countries after
few years of the adoption of IT. Interestingly, we also find that the predictable component
of inflation gap started declining few years before these countries publicly joined the IT
regime. This implies that the central banks of the IT adopting countries started targeting
inflation implicitly before becoming an explicit inflation targeter.
Our findings that in addition to cross-country heterogeneity, there is also significant
time-variation in the success of the IT countries in achieving their targets can reconcile
the two conflicting views on the effectiveness of IT. The finding that the IT countries have
been successful in achieving their target is consistent with the literature that suggests that
IT regime leads to a gradual build up in the credibility of the central banks (Neumann
and von Hagen (2002), Carare and Stone (2006), Creel and Hubert (2010), de Mendonc¸a
and de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012)). The finding that there is considerable cross-country
heterogeneity in the performance of the central banks immediately after the adoption is
consistent with the literature which suggests the countries that started with high inflation
benefitted more from this regime (Levin et al. (2004), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007)
and Batini and Laxton (2007)). Our panel data analysis suggests that the relative success of
these countries in achieving their targets is influenced by their institutional characteristics.
In particular, we find that high debt-GDP ratio constrains the ability of the central bank
to bridge the gap between inflation and target. We also find that financial development
indicators and macroeconomic performance significantly affect the inflation gap in these IT
countries.
2 Data Description
One of the contributions of our paper is to create a comprehensive database of explicit
inflation targets for all the IT countries. Table 1 shows the list of countries that have
adopted IT regime. It includes information on the date of adoption, the initial target and
the target at the end of the 2013. If there is a range for the target, we consider midpoints
of target ranges. Israel and Poland have the highest gap between the two periods’ target
level, 14.5 to 2 and 8.25 to 2.5 percent, respectively. Figure 1 represents the target level at
the date of adoption compared to the target level in 2013. Panel (a) shows the target level
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at the adoption date and panel (b) depicts the level in 2013. In general, the target level has
been decreasing over the past 25 years.
Table 1 also shows the type of target path for each IT country. The literature has
classified the behavior of inflation targets into two categories: ‘convergence’ and ‘stationary’
target path. Convergence rates relate to the inflation targeters in which initial target levels
were high, gradually converging to a lower level. Stationary rates indicate a constantly low
level of inflation. In addition, we classify each country into industrial or emerging market
economies based on their level of economic development. Ruge-Murcia (2014) finds that
Canada is an exception, where the price-level itself is stationary.
The data on consumer prices have been obtained from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics and FRED from 1980 through 2013 on a quarterly basis. The data on inflation
targets have been obtained from the central banks’ websites, and other studies (Mishkin and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Batini and Laxton (2007), Hammond (2012) and Leyva (2008))3.
Figure 2 presents the annual inflation rates and targets for our samples. The vertical
lines indicate the date of IT adoption. A visual inspection suggests that over medium
to long-horizons though there are significant and protracted gap between actual and the
inflation target at the beginning of the IT regime for most of the countries, this gap seems
have narrowed down over time.
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the inflation rates for all 27 countries. Inflation
targeters like Colombia, Ghana, Poland, Romania and Serbia have the highest pre-IT
inflation levels; the average of those is above 20 percent. However, the mean of post-IT
inflation is significantly low. A substantial gap exists between the means before and after
the policy. This gap for Colombia, Ghana, Poland, Romania and Serbia is 15.09, 11.96,
20.36, 17.08 and 18.47 percent, respectively.
Conventionally, inflation variability is measured by the standard deviation of inflation.
Table 2 also presents the standard deviation for pre- and post-IT. A significant reduction
in the standard deviation is noted after the adoption of IT. This dramatic reduction in
the standard deviation can be seen in targeters such as Brazil, Ghana, Peru, Romania,
Serbia and Turkey. Overall, Figure 2 and Table 2 depict the existence of a lower mean and
standard deviation in the post-IT period.
3More details on inflation target data are available upon request.
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3 A Time-Varying Parameter Model for Inflation Gap
In this section, we propose to test the success of the IT countries in achieving their
inflation targets. There are different ways to assess the success of the IT regimes in achieving
their targets. The simplest method is to look at the inflation gap between actual inflation
and the target over time. Figure 2 plots inflation and inflation targets for all the countries
together. We observe two main features of this data. First, the difference between the
target and actual inflation is time-varying. Secondly, this gap is not just a white noise. This
implies that there is a predictable component in the inflation gap and this predictability
varies over time. The predicability of the inflation gap can arise due to several reasons.
First, interest rate smoothing behavior by the central bank can lead to a gradual adjustment
towards the target. Secondly, there is a lag in monetary policy transmission and this lag
tends to be higher for prices than real economic activity. Thirdly, the central bank may
have a medium-run horizon and they want to achieve the target not in the very short term.
We study the success of IT regime by decomposing inflation gap into two components:
a predictable and an unpredictable component. The predictable component of the inflation
gap should disappear over time if the IT regime is successful in achieving its target.
Admittedly, if a central bank announces its target, it is not expected to hit the target
within a quarter, but we anticipate the inflation gap, that is forecastable, to disappear over
medium to long-horizon. Actual inflation may always turn out to be different than the
target because of unanticipated shocks, but a successful and credible central bank should
not let this deviation persist.
The hypothesized relationship between the predictable component of inflation gap and
effectiveness of the IT regime is motivated by the monetary policy effectiveness literature
where researchers like Benati and Surico (2008) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) among
others have shown that the aggressive policy stance towards inflation causes a decline
in inflation predictability. The empirical evidence presented in D’Agostino and Surico
(2012) also support the above hypothesis. They find that the inflation forecasts based on
money growth and output growth were significantly more accurate than the na¨ıve forecasts
only during the regimes associated with neither a clear nominal anchor nor a credible
commitment to fight inflation. Therefore, in case of a perfectly successful IT regime, the
only difference between the actual inflation and the target will be the unforecastable news
in the data.
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We measure the predictable component of inflation gap in a very parsimonious way. We
fit an ARMA(p,q) model to inflation gap for all the IT countries. We find that AR(1)
best approximates the inflation gap data for all the IT countries using the BIC. There are
alternative ways to estimate AR(1) model in our example. We can fit the following fixed
coefficient model:
pidevt = α + βpi
dev
t−1 + vt (1)
In the above model, the systematic part or the predictable component is the conditional
mean, α+ βpidevt−1, and the unsystematic component is the error term, vt. If monetary policy
is perfectly successful in achieving its target, then α = β = 0. Intercept represents the bias
and the slope coefficient, β measures the persistence of shock to inflation gap. The problem
with a fixed coefficient model is that it would not be able to capture the time variation in
success of the IT central banks as it restricts the coefficients. The fixed coefficient model
will restrict both the intercept and the slope coefficient to be constant across time. This
implies that the behavior of the central bank for the full sample has remained fixed and the
persistence property of the shocks affecting the inflation gap has also remained the same.
To take care of the problems associated with a fixed coefficient model, we modify the above
model and allow the coefficients to vary with time. In particular, we allow the coefficients
to follow a random walk. Our time-varying parameter (TVP) model becomes:
pidevt = αt + βtpi
dev
t−1 + vt (2)
The subscript t signifies time-varying coefficients. There are alternative approaches of
modeling time variation that includes structural break as well as Markov switching in the
reaction function coefficients. The usual test of time variation has a low power against the
alternative, that is, it is difficult to distinguish between different forms of time variation.
As in Boivin and Giannoni (2006), we note that structural break models are very special
cases of time variation and does not allow for the gradual evolution of monetary policy.
Moreover, time-varying parameter model may also be used as a good approximation of
multiple breaks in the reaction function coefficients 4.
4Stock and Watson (2002) and Boivin and Giannoni (2006) discuss merits of the TVP model over other
forms of structural break.
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The state-space representation of the above model is given by:
Yt = Ftθt + vt, vt ∼ N (0, Vt)
θt = Gtθt−1 + wt, wt ∼ N (0,Wt) (3)
The system matrices are:
Ft =
(
1 Yt−1
)
, Vt = σ
2
v (4)
Gt = I2, Wt =
(
σ2α 0
0 σ2β
)
(5)
where θt = (αt, βt)
′. Yt is pidevt and we assume the initial state, θ0, is normally distributed
with the mean m0 and variance G0 and the sequences vt and wt are independent of θ0.
We use Kalman filtering algorithms to obtain the means and variances of the conditional
distributions of the unobservable states given the data. Giovanni et al. (2009) argue that a
na¨ıve use of the Kalman filter causes numerical instability issues. One way to overcome this
problem is to define more robust algorithms. We utilize a singular value decomposition-based
algorithm proposed by Wang et al. (1992). Given observed data, {pidev1 , . . . , pidevT }, we find
the optimal ‘signal extraction’ and the optimal ‘h-step ahead prediction’ of states and data. 5
Figure 3 shows the time-varying conditional expectations of the inflation deviation from
its target. The residuals which are the unpredictable component from our model are also
plotted along with the predictable component which is the conditional mean. The vertical
line represents the date of adoption of the IT regime. For comparison, we also estimate
the conditional mean three years prior to the adoption. Since the inflation targets prior
to adoption are not available, we use the initial inflation target for each country. In many
cases, these targets were known in advance since the countries announce them prior to the
official adoption of IT regime.
We observe some clear and interesting patterns in our estimated results. First, we find
that there is considerable heterogeneity in the success of the IT countries in bridging the
gap between actual inflation and the target in the years immediately after the adoption of
the IT regime. We find that the conditional mean of the inflation gap was close to zero
for countries with relatively low level and volatility of inflation even at the beginning of
5For details, see Zivot and Yollin (2012).
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this regime. For example, we can clearly observe that the conditional mean in Australia,
Canada, Chile, New Zealand and Sweden hovered around zero for most of the time period
after the adoption of the IT regime. On the other hand, there are countries like Brazil,
Colombia, Guatemala, Iceland, Mexico among others where the conditional mean was not
close to zero during the initial years of this regime. However, we find that the predictable
component of inflation converged to zero implying higher degree of success in achieving the
target for almost all the IT countries after few years of the adoption of IT.
Interestingly, we also find that the predictable component of inflation gap starts declining
few years before these countries publicly joined the IT regime. Since the targets are not
available prior to the date of adoption, we use the target level announced at the time of
the adoption of IT. The results imply that the central banks of the IT adopting countries
started targeting inflation implicitly before becoming an explicit inflation targeter. Usually,
the countries make an announcement about their intention to move to full-fledged inflation
targeting at a future date. There is usually a time lag involved between the announcement
and the formal move to new regime. Our results that the predictable component starts
declining before the formal date of adoption may reflect this time lag. Secondly, we find
that for most of the countries, the residuals or the unpredictable component in the TVP-AR
model is significant. This implies that the na¨ıve way of just looking at inflation gap and not
making the distinction between the predictable and the unpredictable component would not
provide us the proper understanding into the effectiveness of the IT regime in meeting its
target.
Our findings that in addition to cross-country heterogeneity, there is also significant
time-variation in the success of the IT countries in achieving their targets can reconcile
the two conflicting views on the effectiveness of IT. The finding that the IT countries have
been successful in achieving their target is consistent with the literature suggesting that
the IT regime leads to a gradual build up in the credibility of the central banks (Neumann
and von Hagen (2002), Carare and Stone (2006), Creel and Hubert (2010), de Mendonc¸a
and de Guimara˜es e Souza (2012)). The finding that there is considerable cross-country
heterogeneity in the performance of the central banks immediately after the adoption is
consistent with the literature which suggests the countries that started with high inflation
tended to have benefited more from the IT regime in terms of lower level and volatility of
inflation over a medium to long-horizon. Our estimates also suggest that the conditional
mean of inflation gap for these emerging economies has gradually declined over time was
not very close to zero at the beginning of the IT regime.
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Our approach estimates the conditional mean of inflation gap using information from
only the past values of inflation gap. It is conceivable that the expansion of information
set in the calculation of conditional mean may provide us a different estimate. However, it
should be noted that our estimated conditional mean consistently show a clear pattern for
all the countries and even if information set is expanded, we should be able to find similar
pattern in the data. Moreover, a complex model is more prone to mis-specifiation especially
since we are estimating the conditional mean of all the IT countries.
To dig deeper into the behavior of predictable component, we look at the evolution of
the intercept, α, and the slope, β, separately. Figure 4 shows the time-variation in α and
β coefficients. The left graphs show the intercept coefficients over time, αt, and the right
graphs present the time-varying AR coefficients, βt. The vertical lines in each panel indicate
the date of the adoption of IT.
The results for time-varying intercept and slope coefficients suggest that the estimated
intercepts are driving the results in countries where the predictable component of inflation
was significant at the beginning of the IT regime. This was not the case for the countries
with low level and volatility of inflation. These are also the countries with very low
conditional mean or the predictable component. 6
4 Institutional Characteristics and Inflation Targeting
Effectiveness
It has been argued in the literature that the success of IT depends on the institutional
strength of the country that adopts this regime. Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001)
suggest that the success of full-fledged inflation targeting is based on five pillars: the
absence of other nominal anchors, an institutional commitment to price stability, the lack
of fiscal dominance, policy instrument independence and accountability. In this section, we
examine this hypothesis by investigating whether the success of IT countries in achieving
their targets is determined by the strength of their institutions. To do so, we examine
6It should be noted that the persistence parameter beta for inflation gap is different than the inflation
persistence parameter that has attracted widespread attention from researchers. One of the implications
of that strand of research is that higher credibility of a central bank is associated with lower persistence
implying that a shock to inflation disappears quickly as inflationary expectations are anchored. For example,
see Cogley et al. (2010), Tillmann (2012) among others.
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the role of fiscal situation, central bank independence, financial market development and
macroeconomic outcomes. Fiscal stance is measured by the debt-GDP ratio. We measure
the financial market development using domestic private credit to the real sector by deposit
money banks. We obtain the data on these variables from the International Financial
Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund. Financial depth and financial
sophistication are measured by stock market capitalization to GDP and Central Bank
Assets to GDP, respectively. The data are obtained from the World Bank. The central
bank independence measure is calculated by the turnover rate of the central bank governor’s
tenure (Cukierman et al. (1994)). The rapid turnover signifies less autonomy and instability
in the policy regime. This index is the inverse measure of central bank independence. The
details of the construction of this index is provided in Appendix A. We also use GDP per
capita as the measure of macroeconomic outcomes in our analysis. Since we are interested
in the relationship between inflation gap and institutional characteristics, we only consider
the post-IT sample period for each country.
To examine the impact of institutions on the deviation of actual inflation from the target,
we consider a dynamic fixed-effects specification:
Yit = Xi,tβ1 +Witβ2 + ηi + λt + i,t (6)
where Yit = pi
dev
it = piit − pi∗it. Xit includes strictly exogenous regressors, Wit are
predetermined regressors including lags of Y . ηi is the country-specific characteristics and
λt is the time-specific effect. Xi,t is a (K − 1) ∗ 1 vector of regressors and i,t ∼ N (0, σ2 ) is
a random disturbance. We assume the following:
σ2 ≥ 0
E(i,t, j,s) = 0 i 6= j or t 6= s
E(ηi, j,t) = 0
E(Xi,t, j,s) = 0
(7)
In our analysis, we regress inflation gap on a set of regressors including its own lag,
GDP growth, money growth, central bank independence index, central bank assets to GDP
ratio, stock market capitalization to GDP and private credit to GDP ratio. In addition of
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inflation gap, we also consider cumulative inflation gap as a dependent variable because
central banks may not try to achieve their target every period because of the noise in the
aggregate inflation data, but instead they may want to focus on cumulative deviation as
consistent deviation from the target may affect its credibility.
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results for the panel analysis. Our panel estimation
includes both the individual and time-specific effects. We also use Panel Corrected
Standard Errors (PCSE) introduced by Beck and Katz (1995). The results are economically
meaningful and signs on the coefficients are consistent with the existing findings in the
literature. To control for the lag dependence, we include the lag of dependent variable
as explanatory variables. The results suggest significant dependence of inflation and
cumulative inflation gap on their past. This is consistent with the findings of the previous
section.
Higher debt-GDP ratio is a measure of increased debt burden and has bearing on the
conduct of the monetary policy. We find that higher debt burden is associated with higher
inflation gap and this relationship is significant at all levels of significance. This relationship
remains robust to the use of cumulative deviation as a dependent variable. This finding is
consistent with the fiscal dominance theory which suggests that fiscal indiscipline constrains
monetary policy and may affect the central bank’s ability to function prudently. We
observe that the inverse of central bank independence index measured by the central bank
governor’s turnover ratio has a positive impact on the inflation deviation and cumulative
inflation deviation. It implies that greater central bank autonomy lowers the inflation
gap and cumulative inflation deviation. The independence of central banks is one of the
preconditions for adopting inflation targeting. There is a consensus in the central banking
literature that greater central bank independence is associated with lower and more stable
inflation (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) and Batini and Laxton (2007)).
The variable real money growth is used as an indicator of inflationary pressure in
the economy. We find that an increase in real money growth is associated with lower
inflation gap and cumulative inflation gap. This is a counterintuitive result. One
proposed explanation of this counterintuitive sign is that in many emerging economies
real money growth reflects the level of financial development. This is especially true
in countries where dollarization is a strong feature of the economy. In this scenario,
finding a negative coefficient on real money growth is not surprising. We also find that
higher GDP growth is associated with higher inflation gap. Higher inflation due to higher
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GDP growth will lead to an increase of inflation gap in countries with stationary target rates.
We also examine the relationship between financial market depth indicators and inflation
gap. For this purpose, we look at two measures of financial soundness: central bank assets
to GDP and private credit to GDP ratios. We don’t find significant relationship between
central bank assets to GDP ratio and inflation gap. However, we find that private credit
to GDP ratio positively and significantly affects inflation and cumulative inflation gap. If
private credit is just an indicator of financial market depth, then we would have expected
inflation gap to go down in response to higher private credit to GDP ratio. However, it
has been argued that in many emerging economies a rapid increase in private credit may
indicate overheating the economy and in that case it’s not surprising that we find positive
relationship with inflation and cumulative inflation gap.
Overall, our results from the panel analysis are largely consistent with the literature
where researchers have argued that for the success of inflation targeting regime, stable and
strong institutional set up is required. We find that the success of IT countries in terms
of achieving their targets is strongly associated with the extent of fiscal discipline and
macroeconomic performance.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the effectiveness of inflation targeting countries in terms of
their success in achieving their explicit inflation targets. Keeping in mind that there are
unanticipated shocks that can affect actual inflation, we propose to test the effectiveness of
the central bank by decomposing the inflation gap, the difference between actual inflation
and inflation targets, into predictable and unpredictable components. We argue that the
predictable component of inflation gap, which we measure by the conditional mean of a
time-varying parameter autoregressive model should converge to zero if the IT regime
is successful in achieving the target. Our results find considerable heterogeneity in the
success of these IT countries in achieving their targets at the start of this policy regime.
We find that countries like Canada and New Zealand have been consistently successful,
whereas there was a gradual decline in the predictable component of inflation gap in some
emerging market economies like Colombia, Guatemala and Turkey. Interestingly, we also
find that the predictable component of inflation gap started declining few years before
these countries publicly joined the IT regime. This implies that the central banks of the IT
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adopting countries started targeting inflation implicitly before becoming an explicit inflation
targeter. Our panel data analysis suggests that the relative success of these countries in
achieving their targets is influenced by their institutional characteristics particularly by
fiscal discipline and macroeconomic performance.
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Appendix A
In this appendix, we explain how to construct the central bank independence measure.
Cukierman et al. (1994) develop four measures of central bank independence and measure
their correlation with the inflation outcomes. The legal index, the rate of turnover of
central bank governors, an index based on a questionnaire answered by specialists and
an aggregation of the legal index with the turnover rate. They conclude that the legal
independence is negatively related to the inflation in industrial countries, but not in
developing countries. We consider the turnover of central bank governors as an index
for central bank independence. We use the turnover index because this index is more
accurate than the legal index or questionnaire based criterion in the emerging market
economies. This index is more accurate in those countries because of the fact that the
legal index is based on central bank laws and it doesn’t reflect the central bank independence.
We construct the index based on the findings of Cukierman et al. (1994) by assuming
that above a threshold, a rapid turnover of central bank governors determines a higher
dependence and a lower ICBI. If the political authorities frequently choose a new governor,
they have the opportunity to pick those who favor the nominators’ will. Frequent turnover
reflects firing those who challenge the government. This is true especially in developing
countries. Therefore, the measure for this index is in accordance with the electoral cycle for
the central banks. If the turnover of central bank governor is four years the index will be
.25, and so on.
Using the turnover index, we find the central bank independence for all inflation
targeters. Table A1 presents the average annual turnover rates in our sample countries
for two time periods, 1980–1999 and 2000–2013. The average annual turnover rates are
calculated from the ratio of governor changes to the number of years in that period. The
average turnover rate during 1980–1999 ranges from a minimum of 0.0 to a maximum of
0.2. An average turnover of 0.0 indicates no change in the last 20 years. Canada, Colombia,
the Czech Republic, Hungary and the United Kingdom are the few examples of totally
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independent structures. However, countries like Chile, Poland and Turkey have the highest
rates of dependency. The central banks’ independence has increased from the period 1980–
1999 to 2000– 2013. In the first period, there are five countries with totally independent
central banks; whereas, after 2000 it has risen to 13 countries. In general, the average
annual turnover rate reduced significantly in 15 countries, i.e. the degree of central bank
independence has been increasing over time.
Table A1: Average Annual Turnover Rates of the central bank governors for inflation
targeters, 1980–2013
Countries 1980–1999 2000–2013 Countries 1980–1999 2000–2013
United States 0.05 0.07 Mexico 0.10 0.14
Armenia 0.10 0.07 New Zealand 0.15 0.07
Australia 0.05 0.00 Norway 0.15 0.00
Brazil 0.05 0.07 Peru NA 0.14
Canada 0.00 0.00 Philippines 0.15 0.07
Chile 0.20 0.07 Poland 0.20 0.14
Colombia 0.00 0.07 Romania 0.15 0.00
Czech 0.00 0.00 Serbia NA 0.21
Ghana 0.15 0.21 South Africa 0.05 0.00
Guatemala NA NA South Korea 0.10 0.00
Hungary 0.00 0.00 Sweden 0.10 0.14
Iceland 0.10 0.00 Thailand 0.15 0.00
Indonesia 0.05 0.00 Turkey 0.20 0.00
Israel 0.15 0.14 UK 0.00 0.00
Note: Average number of changes a year
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Table 1: Inflation targeting countries in the world, 1989–2013
Countries Adoption Date Target (adoption date) Target (2013) Group Target Path
Armenia 2006Q1 4 4 EME Convergence
Australia 1993Q2 2.5 2.5 IND Stationary
Brazil 1999Q2 8 4.5 EME Convergence
Canada 1991Q1 4 2 IND Stationary
Chile 1999Q3 3 3 EME Stationary
Colombia 1999Q3 5 3 EME Convergence
Czech 1997Q4 6 2 EME Stationary
Ghana 2002Q1 12 8 EME Convergence
Guatemala 2005Q1 5 4.5 EME Convergence
Hungary 2001Q2 7 3 EME Convergence
Iceland 2001Q1 3.5 2.5 IND Stationary
Indonesia 2005Q3 5 4.5 EME Convergence
Israel 1992Q1 14.5 2 EME Stationary
Mexico 2001Q1 5 3 EME Stationary
New Zealand 1989Q4 4 2 IND Stationary
Norway 2001Q1 2.5 2.5 IND Stationary
Peru 2002Q1 2.5 2 EME Stationary
Philippines 2002Q1 4.7 4 EME Stationary
Poland 1998Q1 8.25 2.5 EME Stationary
Romania 2005Q3 7.5 2.5 EME Convergence
Serbia 2006Q3 8 4 EME Convergence
South Africa 2000Q1 3 4.5 EME Stationary
South Korea 1998Q2 9 3 EME Stationary
Sweden 1993Q1 2 2 IND Stationary
Thailand 2000Q2 1.75 3 EME Stationary
Turkey 2006Q1 5 5 EME Convergence
UK 1992Q3 3 2 IND Stationary
Note: EME and IND indicate Emerging Market and Industrial Economies, respectively.
Source: Adoption dates and inflation targets are taken from the central banks’ web pages. Country
group and target path are based on Schmidt-Hebbel (2009).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of inflation
Countries Period Mean St Dev Countries Period Mean St Dev
Armenia
Pre-IT 10.70 23.20
New Zealand
Pre-IT 10.41 4.57
Post-IT 5.54 2.66 Post-IT 2.31 1.40
Whole 8.69 18.14 Whole 4.50 4.49
Australia
Pre-IT 6.49 3.07
Norway
Pre-IT 4.69 3.04
Post-IT 2.62 1.30 Post-IT 1.81 1.11
Whole 4.10 2.85 Whole 3.58 2.86
Brazil
Pre-IT 12.25 14.11
Peru
Pre-IT 13.05 13.87
Post-IT 6.32 2.49 Post-IT 2.66 1.49
Whole 7.72 7.39 Whole 7.52 10.78
Canada
Pre-IT 5.77 2.73
Philippines
Pre-IT 9.82 8.86
Post-IT 1.96 1.15 Post-IT 4.23 1.85
Whole 3.12 2.51 Whole 7.87 7.68
Chile
Pre-IT 14.43 6.95
Poland
Pre-IT 24.23 8.40
Post-IT 3.03 2.14 Post-IT 3.87 2.82
Whole 9.55 7.84 Whole 9.62 10.56
Colombia
Pre-IT 20.26 4.28
Romania
Pre-IT 22.52 11.98
Post-IT 5.17 2.10 Post-IT 5.44 1.90
Whole 13.82 8.33 Whole 13.21 11.85
Czech
Pre-IT 10.72 4.12
Serbia
Pre-IT 26.53 21.23
Post-IT 3.12 2.62 Post-IT 8.06 3.15
Whole 5.14 4.58 Whole 18.83 18.64
Ghana
Pre-IT 24.82 12.38
South Africa
Pre-IT 11.19 3.65
Post-IT 12.86 4.42 Post-IT 5.71 2.63
Whole 20.03 11.58 Whole 8.94 4.20
Guatemala
Pre-IT 11.05 9.32
South Korea
Pre-IT 5.73 3.54
Post-IT 5.70 2.90 Post-IT 2.89 1.23
Whole 9.64 8.48 Whole 4.38 3.05
Hungary
Pre-IT 14.17 7.40
Sweden
Pre-IT 6.85 2.56
Post-IT 4.87 1.75 Post-IT 1.37 1.34
Whole 10.66 7.48 Whole 3.39 3.26
Iceland
Pre-IT 9.15 8.86
Thailand
Pre-IT 4.26 2.55
Post-IT 5.65 3.32 Post-IT 2.63 1.87
Whole 7.63 7.2 Whole 3.61 2.43
Indonesia
Pre-IT 10.00 9.10
Turkey
Pre-IT 45.02 24.88
Post-IT 7.02 3.64 Post-IT 7.98 1.71
Whole 9.20 8.18 Whole 31.62 26.73
Israel
Pre-IT 16.86 1.84
UK
Pre-IT 5.85 2.32
Post-IT 4.49 3.99 Post-IT 2.17 0.91
Whole 7.11 6.27 Whole 3.48 2.36
Mexico
Pre-IT 16.20 8.68
Post-IT 4.31 0.83
Whole 9.64 8.33
Note: ‘Pre-IT’ refers to the period before the inflation targeting is
adopted by each county.‘Whole’ refers to the entire sample.
Source: Authors’ calculation.
20
Table 3: Institutional characteristics and inflation gap: Panel estimation results
Dependent variable:
pidev pidevcsum
(1) (2)
pidevt−1 0.419
∗∗∗
(0.075)
pidevt−2 −0.180∗∗∗
(0.062)
pidevcsum,t−1 1.224
∗∗∗
(0.074)
pidevcsum,t−2 −0.340∗∗∗
(0.066)
Moneyg −0.064∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.026)
PCredit/GDP 0.010∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.003)
GDPg 22.939
∗∗∗ 12.457
(7.995) (8.361)
ICBI 1.634 1.400
(2.452) (1.977)
CBAssets/GDP 0.005 0.009
(0.023) (0.024)
Debt/GDP 0.026∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The dependent variables are inflation gap, pidev, and the cumulative inflation gap, pidevcsum.
The regressors are lagged dependent variables, real money growth, Moneyg, private credit to
GDP ratio, PCredit/GDP , real GDP growth, GDPg, the inverse measure of central bank
independence, ICBI, central bank assets to GDP ratio, CBAssets/GDP , and the government
debt to GDP, Debt/GDP . Note that the robust standard errors are reported in parentheses,
according to the Beck and Katz (1995) method, a.k.a. Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE).
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Figure 1: Target level at the adoption date and 2013
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Figure 2: Annual inflation rates and targets in inflation targeting countries, 1980–2013
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and central
banks’ websites.
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Figure 2: Annual inflation rates and targets in inflation targeting countries, 1980–2013
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on data from IMF’s International Financial Statistics and central bank
websites.
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Figure 3: Time-varying conditional expectations of inflation gap and residuals from the
TVP-AR model
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 3: Time-varying conditional expectations of inflation gap and residuals from the
TVP-AR model
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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Figure 4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
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Figure 4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
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Figure 4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
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Figure 4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
30
Intercepts (Peru)
Time
α
2000 2005 2010
0
10
25
AR Coefficients (Peru)
Time
β
2000 2005 2010
−
6
−
2
1
Intercepts (Philippines)
Time
α
2000 2005 2010
−
0.
6
0.
2
AR Coefficients (Philippines)
Time
β
2000 2005 2010
0.
5
0.
9
Intercepts (Poland)
Time
α
1995 2000 2005 2010
0.
0
1.
0
AR Coefficients (Poland)
Time
β
1995 2000 2005 2010
0.
6
0.
9
Intercepts (Romania)
Time
α
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
0
40
10
0
AR Coefficients (Romania)
Time
β
2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
−
12
−
4
(e)
Figure 4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
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Figure 4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
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Figure 4: Filtered Time-Varying Coefficients
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